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ABSTRACT: In this paper we assess the financial supervision and regulation structure in Romania. 
To  this  purpose,  we  calculate  and  interpret  the  Financial  Supervision  Unification  Index  (FSU 
Index) and the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA) at the level of the year 2011 
(August), according to Masciandaro’s methodology (2004) for all EU27 member countries in order 
to make comparisons  with the Romanian ones. We propose a change in the present Romanian 
financial supervisory regime from the silos model to a hybrid one, arrangement that supposes a 
combination of the sectoral model with the objectives-centred model.  
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In  the  context  of  present  financial  turmoil,  the  importance  of  banking  supervision  and 
regulation in order to maintain the financial stability became a very important issue for central bank 
and supervision authorities. The international financial crisis started in the USA was felt within the 
Romanian banking system in October 2008 through turbulence on the domestic monetary market. In 
the  next  year,  this  increased  in  intensity  and  the  banking  activity  in  Romania  was  faced  with 
downfall. The main effect was the slow-down of the development pace of non-governmental loan, 
due  to  the  decrease  in  both  demand  and  offer.  As  a  result  of  the  aggressive  crediting  policy 
developed in the last years and the worsening of the financial situation of many companies and 
population,  throughout the  year  2009  the  quality  of  the  loans’  portfolio  began  to  continuously 
deteriorate. 
In this paper we assess the financial supervision and regulation structure in Romania. The 
paper is structured as follows: the first part consists of a brief literature review while in the second 
section  we  assess  the  Romanian  regulation  and  supervision  architecture.  To  this  purpose,  we 
calculate and interpret the Financial Supervision Unification Index (FSU Index) and the Central 
Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA) at the level of the year 2011 (August), according to 
Masciandaro’s methodology (2004) for all EU27 member countries in order to make comparisons 
with Romanian ones. In the end, we will present the conclusions of this study and some policy 
recommendations. 
This  paper  is  relevant  not  only  for  the  research  in  the  area,  but  for  policy  makers.  It 
discusses about the financial supervision structure in Romania and proposes a change in the present 
architecture. Also, using the Masciandaro’s methodology, we assess how the financial supervision 
and  regulatory  structure  had  developed  in  EU27  countries  between  2004-2011,  underling  the 
implication of European integration process and the international financial crises started in august 
2007.  We  indentify  a  profile  of  financial  supervision  and  regulatory  structure  in  Romania 
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comparing with EU27 countries taking into account the supervisory concentration degree and the 
central bank involvement in financial supervision and we explain the main factors which shaped it. 
 
Literature review 
The  issues  regarding  financial  supervision  architecture  are  studied  in  many  papers. 
Llewellyn (2006) considers some of the issues involved in organising the institutional structure of 
financial supervision: why institutional structure is important in the design of optimal regulatory 
regimes, and why the issue has arisen at the present time; the range of alternative options within a 
Regulation Matrix; the advantages and potential hazards of  integrated, unified, and Twin Peak 
agencies; the role of the central bank in alternative institutional structures; corporate governance 
arrangements of regulatory and supervisory agencies and their contribution to the effectiveness of 
regulation and supervision. Davis and Green (2008) make an essential guide in global financial 
regulation.  
Certain  studies  deal  with  which  model  is  appropriate:  the  multi-agencies  model  or  the 
integrated  one?  Hölmström  and  Milgrom  (1991)  consider  that,  in  a  multitask  assignment  in 
monitoring case, the provision of incentives distorts the agency's effort against the activities whose 
results  are  less  measurable.  Dewatripont,  Jewitt  and  Tirole  (1999a,  b)  also  argue  that  a  broad 
mission  for  an  agency  will  make  the  market  evaluation  of  the  bureaucrats  more  difficult  and 
therefore provide them with less incentive to exert effort. Gale and Vives (1993), Boot and Thakor 
(1993) proposed separation between the conflicting tasks “supervision” and “intervention” in order 
to mitigate passivity in intervention due to the trade off of career concerns and reputation of the 
regulator.  Kane  (1984),  Romano  (1997,  2001),  Kupiec  and  White  (1996)  underline  that  a 
decentralized structure encourages financial innovation. In Garicano and Lastra (2010) view, recent 
events show that financial innovation is of limited value relative to the risk engendered and more 
centralized and hierarchical system is needed. Briault (1999) and Llewellyn (1999) emphasize that a 
single  regulator  will  be  more  efficient  at  monitoring  these  activities.  Shleifer  (1985)  and 
Dewatripont  and  Tirole  (1999)  agree  that  competition  between  regulators  may  generate  more 
information.  Briault  (1999),  Llewellyn  (1999),  Abrams  and  Taylor  (2002)  find  that  a  single 
regulator will be more transparent and accountable than multiple regulators. Taylor (1995), Kane 
(1996), Briault (1999), Llewellyn (1999) worry that a single regulator may have excessive power.  
Another issue in choosing the optimal financial supervision structure is the central bank 
involvement or not. Bini Smaghi (2000) provides some evidence with data about 21 industrial 
countries in the period 1974-1990 that central banks involved in banking supervision deliver on 
average  a  higher  rate  of  inflation,  even  after  controlling  for  the  degree  of  central  bank 
independence. Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) present econometric evidence that the inflation rate is 
higher and more volatile in countries in which the central bank has the monopoly of supervision. 
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) note that independent central banks, which are generally better 
at fighting inflation, are also more likely to not have responsibility for banking supervision. From 
another point of view, Giddy (1994), Lastra, (1992), Abrams and Taylor (2001) affirm that the 
prestige and independence of central banks enhances their ability to enforce actions and to recruit 
and retain the best staff. Gulde and Wolf (2004) sustain only a formal involvement of the central 
bank in the supervision activity.  
Some studies deal with the optimal financial supervision model for EU. Di Giorgio and Di 
Noia  (2001)  discuss  pros  and  cons  of  different  models  for  financial  market  regulation  and 
supervision and present a proposal for the re-organization of regulatory and supervisory agencies in 
the Euro Area with 4-peak regulatory architecture objectives oriented – macroeconomic stability, 
microeconomic  stability,  investor  protection  and  proper  behavior,  efficiency  and  competition. 
Garicano and Lastra (2010) suggest a set of seven principles that must govern the redesign of the 
EU financial supervision system. Masciandaro (2010) assesses the present EU financial regulation 
and supervisory reform. Eijffinger (2001) considers that a European Financial Service Authority Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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(EFSA)  will  be  able  to  increase  the  overall  transparency  of  the  banking  supervision,  because 
banking and securities market tend to be integrated. 
Masciandaro  (2004)  is  the  first  who  has  built  two  indexes  which  measure  financial 
supervision concentration and central bank involvement in financial supervision. Based on these 
indexes, there are some studies which assess financial supervision arrangements. In Masciandaro 
(2007), it is analyzed how the central bank role can influence the unification process of the overall 
financial supervision architecture. Masciandaro and Quintyn (2010) also test the path-dependence 
effect  describing  and  evaluating  the  evolution  and  the  present  state  of  the  architecture  of  six 
national supervisory regimes in South Eastern Europe (SEE): Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, 
Serbia, and Turkey. 
Regulation and supervision architecture in Romania 
In practice various models of financial supervision can be met. Four approaches could be 
identified for financial market supervision and regulation: "institutional supervision", "supervision 
by objectives", "functional supervision", "single-regulator supervision" and hybrid supervision. The 
institutional  supervision  or  sectoral  supervision  or  silos  model  is  performed  over  each  single 
segment of the  financial  market and  is assigned to a distinct agency  for the entire complex of 
activities.  In  case  of  the  supervisory  model  by  objectives,  also  called  “twin  peaks”,  all 
intermediaries and markets are subjected to the control of more than one authority, each single 
authority being responsible for one objective of regulation. The third regulatory model is the so-
called "functional supervision", different functions may be regulated differently and by different 
agencies  irrespective  of  which  institutions  are  performing  those  functions. The  single-regulator 
supervisory model is based on just one control authority, separated from the central bank, and with 
responsibility  over  all  markets  and  intermediaries,  being  concerned  with  all  the  objectives  of 
regulation (stability, transparency and investor protection, maybe competition). The hybrid regime 
supposes some supervisors monitoring more than one segment of the market and others only one. 
The institutional arrangement for regulation and supervision in Romania is organized by 
financial sectors (institutional supervision). There are four financial sector authorities, the National 
Bank of Romania (NBR), the National Securities Commission (CNVM), the Insurance Supervisory 
Commission (CSA), and the Private Pension System Supervisory Commission (PPSSC). This kind 
of  arrangement  is  also  called  the  vertical  (silos)  model,  with  the  central  bank  supervising  and 
regulating the banks, a security regulator, usually a separate commission overseeing the securities 
markets and an insurance regulator which may or may not be part of a government ministry.  
NBR  represents  the  monetary  and  supervisory  authority.  The  Statute  of  NBR  (Law 
312/2004) granted it as an independent public institution with the following tasks in maintaining 
financial stability: the authorization, regulation and prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
the oversight of the smooth operation of payment systems with a view to ensuring financial stability 
(art. 2 (2) b.). In 2006 NBR was also ascribed the role of monitoring and supervising non-banking 
financial institutions performing credit activities (Law No. 93 of 8 April 2009).  
The National Securities Commission (CNVM), established in 1994, by the Law no. 52/1994, 
is an autonomous administrative authority responsible for regulating and supervising the securities 
market, the regulated commodity and  financial  derivative  instruments  markets, as  well as their 
specific institutions and operations. The CNVM succeeds the Securities Agency established by a 
Government Ordinance 18/1993 as a general department of the Ministry of Public Finance. 
The  Insurance  Supervisory  Commission  (CSA),  set  up  by  the  Law  no.  32/2000,  is  an 
autonomous specialized administrative authority responsible for the authorization and supervision 
of insurance companies, reinsurance companies, insurance and/or reinsurance brokers, as well as 
other intermediaries acting in the insurance and reinsurance business.  
The Supervisory Commission of the Private Pensions System (CSSPP) is founded through 
the Emergency Ordinance no.50, from June 2005, approved by the Law no. 313/November 2005, as 
an autonomous administrative authority entrusted with the regulation, coordination, supervision and Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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control  of  the  activities  of  the  private  pensions  system,  being  responsible  for  the  prudential 
supervision of pension funds. 
Some issues regarding customer protection and competition are dealt with by the National 
Authority for Consumers’ Protection and, respectively by The Competition Council. On 28 January 
2010 the official launch of the Union of Banking Mediators took place, so as to mediate conflicts 
and arguments between the bank and the client, such as: the wrong calculation or the enforcement 
of abusive interests and commissions; errors in the processing of check and card transactions; the 
refusal to restructure the loan in case of payment default; the introduction of abusive provisions; the 
enrollment without previous notice or with a fallacious one in the Loan Office; the modification of 
the reimbursement scheme of the loan without the client’s consent. 
 
Table no. 1.  
Romanian financial supervision and regulation architecture 
 




Financing  Tasks  Appointment 
of the board 
member 
NBR  1990 (2006)  Law  no. 
312/2004, 




  the  authorization, 
regulation  and 
prudential  supervision 
of  credit  institutions 
and the oversight of the 
smooth  operation  of 
payment  systems  with 
a  view  to  ensuring 
financial stability; 
  monitoring  and 
supervising  non-
banking  financial 
institutions  performing 
credit activities 
The  NBR  is 
managed  by  a 
Board  of 
Directors 
composed  by 
nine  members 
appointed  by 
the  Parliament 
to  which  it  is 
also 
accountable. 




  licensing, 
authorizing and issuing 
norms  and  regulations 
regarding  the 
supervision  in  the 
security market; 
The  CNVM  is 
composed  by 
seven members 
appointed  by 
the  Parliament 
to  which  it  is 
also 
accountable. 




  the  authorization, 
supervision  and 
regulation  of  the 
insurance sector; 
  the  resolution  of 
complaints  filed  by 
policyholders  and 
injured  parties  against 
insurance undertakings, 
professional  training 
and  public 
communication. 
CSA  is 
managed  by  a 
Council 
composed  by 
five  members 
all  appointed 
by  the 
Parliament.  
 




  authorizing  and 
supervising  the 
activities carried out in 
the Pension System. 
CSSPP  is 
governed  by  a 
5  member 
Council, named Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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Financing  Tasks  Appointment 
of the board 
member 
  to  protect  the 
interests  of  those 
affiliated to the Pension 
System, by assuring an 
efficient functioning of 
this system. 
 
by  the 
Parliament, 
including  the 
Council 
President  and 




On 31 July 2007, it was signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in the 
field  of  financial  stability  and  financial  crisis  management,  which  established  the  National 
Committee for Financial Stability. The signatories were the Ministry of Finance, NBR, the CNVM, 
the  CSA  and  the  CSSPP.  This  Committee  is  formed  by  the  Ministry  of  Public  Finance,  the 
Governor of NBR, the President of the CNVM, the President of the CSA and the President of the 
CSSPP. Its main tasks are: the promotion of systematic and efficient information exchange between 
the  sectoral  financial  regulators  and  supervisors  and  the  Ministry  of  Public  Finance  and  the 
assessment, prevention and the management of financial crises.  
On 16 February 2009, the Agreement was amended by an additional act, establishing five 
specialized technical sub-committees in the framework of the Committee concerning, respectively, 
financial stability, financial supervision, financial regulation, payment and settlement systems and 
financial statistics.  
The  Romanian  supervision  agencies  have  also  strong  links  with  other  national  and 
international  institutions,  especially  with  regulatory  and  supervisory  authorities  from  European 
Union Member States and with the European Commission. 
The National Bank of Romania participates alongside other Member States to strengthen the 
framework set by the European Union in managing financial crisis. To this purpose, on August 
2007, the Governor of the National Bank of Romania signed the Statement of Adherence to the 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  high-level  principles  of  co-operation  in  crisis  management 
situations (signed by the EU countries in 2003) and to the Memorandum of Understanding on co-
operation between payment systems overseers and banking supervisors (signed by the EU countries 
in 2001).  
On  1  June  2008,  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  co-operation  between  the 
authorities responsible for financial supervision, central banks, and finance ministries from the 
European  Union  in  the  area  of  financial  crisis  management,  which  was  signed  in  2005,  was 
replaced by the Memorandum of Understanding between the authorities responsible for financial 
supervision, central banks, and finance ministries from the European Union members in the field of 
cross-border  financial  stability.  On  behalf  of  Romania,  the  Memorandum  was  signed  by  the 
National  Bank  of  Romania,  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Finance,  the  National  Securities 
Commission, the Insurance Supervisory Commission and the Private Pension Scheme Supervisory 
Commission.  
From January 2011, the former Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees of supervisors" at EU level 
was replaced by the establishment of three European supervisory authorities (ESAs) and a European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) consists of 
the  national  financial  supervisors  and  of  three  new  European  Supervisory  Authorities  for  the 
banking,  securities  and  insurance  and  occupational  pensions  sectors that  is  created through the 
transformation of the existing committees – European Banking Authority, European Securities and 
Markets Authority, and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. The European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) assesses risks to the stability of the entire financial system and issues Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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risk warnings and recommendations when necessary. The ECB provides the analytical, statistical, 
administrative and logistical support to the ESRB. 
The three European supervisory authorities (ESAs) established  acts as a hub of EU and 
national  bodies  safeguarding  public  values  such  as  the  stability  of  the  financial  system,  the 
transparency  of  markets  and  financial  products  and  the  protection  of  customers  (depositors, 
investors,  insurance  policy  holders,  pension  scheme  members  and  beneficiaries).  The  four 
Romanian supervision authorities collaborate with these bodies – the National Bank of Romanian 
with  the  European  Banking  Authority,  The  National  Securities  Commission  with  European 
Securities and Markets Authority and, respectively The Insurance Supervisory Commission and The 
Supervisory  Commission  of  the  Private  Pensions  System  with  the  European  Insurance  and 
Occupational Pensions Authority.   
 
Evaluating the Supervisory Concentration and Central Bank Involvement in financial 
supervision in Romania and EU27 countries: a Comparative Analysis 
 
Methodology 
In what follows we will assess the degree of involvement of the central bank in the financial 
regulation  and  supervision,  as  well  as  the  degree  of  concentration  of  the  power  of  financial 
supervision and regulation at the level of Romania comparatively with the EU27 countries ones. To 
this purpose we calculate and interpret the Financial Supervision Unification Index (FSU Index) 
and the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA) at the level of the year 2011 (August), 
according to Masciandaro’s methodology (2004, 2007). The sources of data are central banks and 
supervisory  agencies’  web  pages,  financial  stability  reports  and  the  European  Central  Bank’s 
Recent developments  in  supervisory  structures report on October 2010. In order to analyse the 
dynamics of this indices between 2004-2011, we use the scores calculated in Masciandaro (2007) 
and Masciandoaro and Quintyn (2010). 
 
FSU Index 
The creation of the FSU Index is based on an analysis of which and how many authorities in 
the sample are empowered to supervise the three traditional sectors of financial activity: banking, 
securities markets, insurance. For calculating FSU Index we consider only the number of agencies 
involved  in  the  supervisory  activities.  At  the  same  time,  we  do  not  consider  the  nature  of  the 
authorities involved in the financial supervision setting. To transform the qualitative information 
into quantitative indications, we assigned a numerical value to each type of authority. Thus, the 
FSU Index was built on the following scale: 7 = Single authority for all three sectors (total number 
of supervisors=1); 5 = Single authority for the banking sector and securities markets (total number 
of supervisors=2); 3 = Single authority for the insurance sector and the securities markets, or for the 
insurance sector and the banking sector (total number of supervisors=2); 1 = Specialized authority 
for each sector (total number of supervisors=3).  
Due to the major importance of banking intermediation and securities markets in relation to 
the insurances a value equal to 5 is assigned to each authority supervising both the banking sector 
and the securities market. A higher degree of concentration of the supervision power is considered 
for the integrated authorities that supervise the banking sector and the securities market than for 
those supervising the banking sector and the insurances, because a higher degree of integration 
seems  to  exist  between  the  supervision  of  banking  sector  and  the  securities  market  than  the 
supervision  of  banking  sector  and  the  insurances.  In  the  case  of  the  countries  where  a  certain 
financial sector is supervised by two authorities, we may encounter the following situations: the 
concentration degree is likely to increase when there are two supervisory authorities in a certain 
sector, if one has supervision prerogatives over a second sector; the concentration degree drops 
when there are two authorities in a certain sector and neither of them has prerogatives over a second Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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sector. In these situations, we will adjust the index as follows: we add 1 if there is at least one sector 
in  the  country  having  two  supervisory  authorities  and  one  of  these  two  authorities  is  also 
responsible for at least another sector; we subtract 1 if there is at least one sector in the country with 




In every country the central bank is the authority responsible for monetary policy and for the 
stability  of  the  payment  system.  The  degree  of  involvement  of  the  central  bank  in  financial 
supervision can be explained by the specific nature of that institution with respect to the others. 
Given the three traditional financial sectors (banking, securities and insurance), the CBFA index is 
equal to: 1 if the central bank has responsibility in no sector; 2 if the central bank has the main (or 
sole) responsibility for banking supervision; 3 if the central bank has responsibility  in any two 
sectors; 4 if the central bank has responsibility in all three sectors.  
Therefore,  each  national  supervisory  regime  can  be  identified  with  at  least  two 
characteristics: the degree of concentration of powers (FSU Index) and the degree of involvement of 
the central bank in that distribution of powers (CBFA Index). 
Both  indexes  are  calculated  for  the  year  2011  for  all  EU27  countries,  underlining  the 
Romanian  supervision  regime  features  comparatively  with  the  other  EU  countries.  We  also 
undertake an investigation of the financial supervision arrangements reform for the period of 2008 – 
2011 in EU27, to see how policy makers react to the present financial crises.  
The  sources  of  the  qualitative  information  in  our  analysis  were:  the  central  banks  and 
supervision  authority  statutes,  the  central  banks  and  supervision  web  pages,  financial  stability 
reports, annual reports.  
Results 
The results of our investigation can be found in Fig. no. 2. The initials have the following 
meaning: B = authority specialized in the banking sector; BI = authority specialized in the banking 
sector and insurance sector; CB = central bank; G = government; I = authority specialized in the 
insurance sector; S = authority specialized in the securities markets; U = single authority for all 
sectors; BS = authority specialized in the banking sector and securities markets; SI = authority 
specialized in the insurance sector and securities markets.  
  
Table no. 2.  
Supervisory Authorities in EU27 countries: FSU Index and CBFA Index (year: 2011) 














Austria  U, CB  U  U  7  -1  6  1  Unified 
Belgium  CB, SI  CB, SI  CB,SI  7  -1  6  3  Twin 
Peaks 
Bulgaria  CB  SI  SI  3  0  3  2  Hybrid 
Cyprus  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2  Silos 
Czech Republic  CB  CB  CB  7  0  7  4  Unified 
Denmark  U  U  U  7  0  7  1  Unified 
Estonia  U  U  U  7  0  7  1  Unified 
Finland  U  U  U  7  0  7  1  Unified 
France  BI, CB  S  BI, CB  3  -1  2  3  Hybrid 
Germany  U, CB  U  U  7  -1  6  1  Unified 
Greece  CB  S  CB  3  0  3  3  Hybrid 
Hungary  U  U  U  7  0  7  1  Unified 
Ireland  CB  CB  CB  7  0  7  4  Unified 
Italy  CB  CB, S  I  1  1  2  3  Hybrid Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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Latvia  U  U  U  7  0  7  1  Unified 
Lithuania  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2  Silos 
Luxembourg  BS, CB  BS, CB  I, CB  5  1  6  4  Hybrid 
Malta  U  U  U  7  0  7  1  Unified 
Netherlands  CB, U  CB, U  CB, U  7  -1  6  4  Twin 
Peaks 
Poland  U  U  U  7  0  7  1  Unified 
Portugal  CB  CB, S  I  1  1  2  3  Hybrid 
Romania  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2  Silos 
Slovak Republic  CB  CB  CB  7  0  7  4  Unified 
Slovenia  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2  Silos 
Spain  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2  Silos 
Sweden  U  U  U  7  0  7  1  Unified 
UK  U  U  U  7  0  7  1  Unified 
Source: our calculation using dates from central banks and supervisory agencies web pages and reports 
 
As we can see it could be four possible patterns in the interaction between the FSU Index 
and the CBFA Index, based on the possible combinations of a high or low level of concentration of 
powers with a high or low level of central bank involvement (Fig. no. 3.). There are two most 
frequent polarized models: 11 countries with a high concentration of powers with low central bank 
involvement (Single Financial Authority Regime) and 10 countries with a  low concentration of 
powers  with  high  central  bank  involvement  (Central  Bank  Dominated  Multiple  Supervisors 
Regime). As a preliminary conclusion, in EU27 the degree of supervision consolidation seems to be 
inversely correlated with the central bank involvement.  
The  reason  of  the  trade off  between  the  supervision  consolidation  and  the  central  bank 
involvement could be explained by the following: because of a fear that the safety net - central bank 
function of lender of last resort - might be spread to a wider set of institutions than just banks if the 
central bank is also involved in supervising insurance and securities trading firms (blurring hazard 
effect);  because  of  fear  of  creation  of  a  too  much  powerful  bureaucratic  agency  (monopolistic 
bureau effect); because of the fact that implementing a monopolistic central bank regime can also 
be costly when the policymaker also delegates the conduct of business controls to the central bank, 
an area in which central banks have traditionally sought not to be involved (conflict of interest 
effect); because the policymaker may face costs in establishing a single financial authority - and 
thus reducing the central bank’s involvement in supervision - if the central bank’s reputation is high 
(reputation effect). 
The mean value of FSU Index of old member countries is 5, while the overall sample shows 
a mean value equal to 4.85. The standard deviation of FSU Index of old member countries is 2.26, 
while  the  overall  sample  shows  a  standard  deviation  equal  to  2.53.  Therefore the  old  member 
countries show a higher and more homogeneous level of concentration.  
The mean value of the CBFA Index of new member countries is 1.92, while the overall 
sample shows a mean value of 2.19. The standard deviation of the CBFA Index of new member 
countries  is 1.08, while the overall  sample  shows a standard deviation of 1.21. Thus, the SEE 
countries show a lower and more homogeneous level of central bank involvement in supervision. Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
 
 



























Fig. no. 1. - The trade-off between the CBFA Index and the FSU Index 2011 in EU27 
Source: our calculation 
 
The distribution of countries according to the model of supervision is exemplified in the Fig. 
no. 4. As we can observe, the predominant model in EU27 is the unified (integrated) model. Some 
countries have reformed their financial supervision architecture, between 2008-2011. Two countries 
(Germany  and  Portugal)  have  changed  the  vertical  (silos)  with  the  hybrid  model,  one  country 
(Belgium) passed from unified to “twin peaks” and one country (Finland) from hybrid to unified. 
Thus, we can notice that the silos model tends to be abandoned, and the concentration of power of 
supervision has increased.   
 
     
Fig. no. 2. - Models of supervision model in EU27 in 2008 vs. 2011 (% of total) 
Source: our calculation 
 
The  model  of  Romanian  financial  supervision  remained  unchanged  during  the  crisis. 
Romania  is  numbered  between  countries  with  Central  Bank  Dominated  Multiple  Supervisors 
Regime, with the minimum score for FSU Index, beside Cyprus, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Spain. 
The central bank is involved only in banking sector supervision. The CBFA Index score places 
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NBR above new members’ average score, but below the old members’ one. There are 11 countries 
with lower CBFA Index than the Romanian one – Austria, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Sweden, and UK. Both indexes’ scores make Romania the country 
with the combination of lowest scores beside Cyprus, Slovenia, Lithuania and Spain, being near the 
low concentration and low central bank involvement pattern. 
Even if NBR is involved only in the banking sector, a reality is worth to be mentioned – the 
Romanian financial system is bank-oriented and the capital, insurance and pension market is less 
developed  and  sophisticated.  This  fact  amplifies  the  role  of  the  Romanian  central  bank  in 
maintaining the stability of the national financial system. 
Another factor that has shaped the present financial supervision regime in Romania is the 
fact that NBR owns a high reputation gained not only by its oldness, but its succeeded actions in the 
past,  while  the  transfer  of  its  prerogative  in  banking  supervision  to  an  integrated  financial 
supervision authority could affect its reputation. For years NBR was also the net debtor to the 
domestic banking system and this could induce a bureaucracy risk, because the Romanian central 
bank was “captured” by the banking sector and could favor the banking industry by its decisions 
and disregard the objectives of financial stability. Another bureaucracy risk is the fact that much 
more power for NBR could cause “abuses of institutional independence”, in the context in which it 
was granted in its statute as an “independent public institution” (Maastricht Treaty condition).  
 
     
Figure no. 3. - The FSU Index and the CBFA Index scores by countries in EU27 (2011) 
Source: our calculation 
 
Conclusions 
In  the  context  of  the  present  international  financial  crisis  the  national  supervisory 
architecture in the EU27 countries was reshaped. Some states have chosen to change their model of 
financial  supervision  and,  for  overall,  they  have  increased  the  concentration  of  power  and  the 
central bank involvement in financial supervision. In this study, using Masciandaro’s methodology, 
we indentify a profile of financial supervision and regulatory structure in Romania comparing with 
EU27  countries,  taking  into  account the  supervisory  concentration  degree  and  the  central  bank 
involvement in financial supervision and we explain the main factors which shaped it.  
The model of the Romanian financial supervision remained unchanged during the crisis and 
our country is numbered between the countries with Central Bank Dominated Multiple Supervisors 
Regime. The Romanian FSU Index records the minimum level and the CBFA Index score places 
NBR above new members’ average score, but below the old members’ one. Both indexes’ scores – 
the FSU Index and CBFA Index - make Romania the country with the lowest scores beside Cyprus, 
Slovenia, Lithuania and Spain. The main factors of shaping the present financial supervision regime 
in  Romania  are:  NBR  owns  a  high  reputation  and  the  transfer  of  its  prerogative  in  banking 
supervision to an integrated financial supervision authority could affect its reputation; for years, 
NBR was the net debtor to the domestic banking system and this could induce a “bureaucracy risk”, Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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because the Romanian central bank was “captured” by the banking sector and there might have 
been the possibility of favoring the banking industry by its decisions and neglecting the objectives 
of  financial  stability;  much  more  power  for  NBR  could  cause  “abuses  of  institutional 
independence”,  in  the  context  in  which  it  was  granted  in  its  statute  as  an  “independent  public 
institution”. As policy recommendations we propose a change in the present Romanian financial 
supervisory regime from the silos model to a hybrid one, arrangement that implies a combination of 
the sectoral model with the objectives-centred model, such as the following: the micro-stability 
(prudential regulation) of the intermediaries could be maintained at the level of the present four 
sectoral  institutions  (NBR,  CNVM,  CSA,  CSSPP),  but  the  transparency  in  the  market,  of 
intermediaries  and  customer  protection  and  respectively  the  safeguarding  and  promotion  of 
competition  in  the  financial  intermediation  sector  should  be  tackled  by  two  other  distinctive 
integrated agencies (all the activities performed by banking, securities, insurance and pension). This 
arrangement is arguable because there were many situations of conflicts between customers and 
financial intermediaries due to abuses caused by the latter, and a specialized authority in financial 
field is needed when dealing with these issues. The Romanian financial markets are also part of the 
European single financial market, with no entry barriers for European financial intermediaries. This 
fact  complicates  the  authorities’  mission  in  safeguarding  and  promoting  the  competition  in  the 
financial  intermediation  sector.  In  the  present,  the  prerogatives  of  protecting  consumers  and 
investors and guaranteeing fair competition are shared by the four sectoral supervisors and certain 
independent  agencies,  which  act  not  only  in  the  financial  sector  (the  National  Authority  for 
Consumers’ Protection, The Competition Council). This is the reason why a financial specialized 
authority dealing with these issues is needed. This proposal could be extended to the EU level, but 
this topic will be treated in another research. 
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